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The subject of the article is the concept of information asymmetry, which currently belongs among 
highly discussed themes in economics. In the article, we deal with the basic concepts, which play an 
important role in the overall perspective on the given issue. One of them is moral hazard, which is a 
fundamental consequence of information asymmetry. The market subjects or individual people often 
misuse their superior informational capabilities for their own use, but at the same time they inadvertently 
contribute to the inefficiency of the specific market, which can lead to extensive market failure. Other 
important consequences include so-called adverse selection, which results in the gradual displacement 
of good products by inferior ones. The occurrence of adverse selection in the specific market then results 
in pressure to reduce prices. In particular, the article analyses the current state of knowledge in the area 
of information economics, on the basis of previously published articles. We also deal with the effect of 
modern technology on the economic mechanism and information asymmetry. One of them is the 
internet, which plays a key role in the transmission of information. The aim of the article is to perform 
an analysis of the current state of knowledge in the area of information asymmetry on the basis of 
relevant published articles, and thus create a comprehensive and compact perspective on the given issue. 
An important section is the analysis of the possible impact of modern technology on information 
asymmetry, where own conclusions are drawn on the basis of findings by various authors. 
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Introduction  
Why is it so difficult to sell an automobile in excellent technical condition for an appropriate price? Can 
we rely on and abide by doctors' instructions, when w  have limited information on and knowledge of 
the given issue? Why does the insured usually treathe insured property less responsibly? Do market 
failures have something to do with the market subjects' different informational capabilities? These ar
just some of an enormous number of questions which, for a long time, the field of economics could not 
answer satisfactorily. Only after the publication of several key economic articles and concepts were 
answers found to some of the questions (Riley, 2001).  
Asymmetry, existing in various forms, has accompanied us through many scientific fields since time 
immemorial. A key type of asymmetry, which fundamentally affects economic fields, is information 
asymmetry. The concept of information asymmetry has been a part of various economic theories for 
almost fifty years. Of course, this does not mean that economists did not deal with the issue of 
informational dissimilarity before that. World-renowned economists were fully aware of the differences 
in individual market subjects' informational capabilities. Nevertheless, for a long time nobody dealt with 
this concept in more detail (Walletzký, 2007). 
The aim of the article is to perform an analysis of the current state of knowledge in the area of 
information asymmetry on the basis of relevant published articles, and thus create a comprehensive and 
compact perspective on the given issue. It focuses primarily on the information asymmetry which occurs 
in financial markets, and which was one of the main c uses of the global financial crisis. 
 
1 Basic concepts connected with information asymmetry 
Before we get to the actual examination of current knowledge in the area of information asymmetry on 
the basis of previously published articles, it is appropriate to define some important basis concepts which 
are closely connected with information asymmetry. 
The elementary concept which needs to be defined is information asymmetry itself. What is information 
asymmetry? In publications, one can find many definitio s of information asymmetry, which mutually 
overlap. According to Sojka (2001), information asymmetry means that “economic subjects on one side 
of the market have much better information than the subjects on the other side“ (Sojka, 2001, p. 40). 
According to Šulc (2012), information asymmetry occurs when “one side of the market is less informed 
than the other side” (Šulc, 2012, p. 192). In other wo ds, the asymmetric distribution of information 
occurs when one side of the market is better informed than the other side. 
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We do not necessarily only have to look for such situat ons in economic sciences; they also occur 
regularly in various life situations outside economics. Information asymmetry is a consequence of 
certain secret or hidden information or activity which one side has at its disposal, unlike the other side. 
On the basis of the secret information, they then gai a significant advantage over other market players 
during various decision-making problems. “Secret activities are those which cannot be observed by other 
subjects accurately and without significant additional costs. Secret information corresponds to situations 
in which one side of the market has more professional k owledge than the other.” (Soukupová et al, 
1996). 
In his article, George Stigler (1961) stresses the very important fact that the cost of procuring 
information is not zero, which is why economic subjects do not search for all information. From this it 
follows that the asymmetric distribution of information can be reduced, or even completely eliminated, 
but at the price of increased overall costs. Thus, it i  quite normal for subjects which have completely 
different information frameworks to meet on the supply and demand sides of the market. According to 
Stiglitz (1973), this means that the economic phrase “supply equals demand” is highly misleading, and 
practically inapplicable under realistic conditions; something with which we can certainly agree. 
 
Information gap 
Walletzký (2007) has introduced the term “information gap” to Czech terminology to describe the 
difference in individual market subjects' informational capabilities. The author defines the information 
gap as the difference in relevant information betwen two market subjects. A positive information gap 
is associated with a market subject which possesses better information than another market subject. If 
the market subject is at a disadvantage, and does nt possess the given information, a negative 
information gap arises in regard to the subject which possesses the information. To describe the removal 
of the information gap, the author introduces the term “filling the information gap”. 
 
Adverse selection 
In principle, we distinguish between two types of information asymmetry, which have a significant 
impact on the functioning of markets. These are information asymmetry about price, and information 
asymmetry about quality. One of the serious consequences of the effect of information asymmetry is so-
called adverse selection. 
Adverse (negative) selection is a state where quality products are displaced by low-quality ones. This 
effect can often be observed in the labour market, where highly productive employees leave and 
inexperienced or less productive ones are hired. A fundamental role here is played by information 
asymmetry on the employer's or employee's part. The employer will almost always be less informed 
about a certain employee's abilities than the specific employee. In this case, the employer has very 
limited options of removing the information gap. Onthe other hand, the better informed employee has 
no reason to share the information about their abilities with the employer (Sojka, 2001).   
Specialized companies, which focus on gathering the relevant information, which they trade and thereby 
can reduce the information asymmetry between both sides, deal with the afore-mentioned issue, and not 
only in the labour market. 
We can find another example of information asymmetry in the insurance market. We can gradually 
observe deterioration in the structure of insured prsons, which causes an overall increase in the riskine s 
of insurance companies' portfolios, for example in life insurance. Nowadays, the situation is such that 
non-smokers pay a part of their insurance policy to cover smokers, which is why they are gradually 
losing interest in this type of insurance (Šulc, 201 ). 
A key consequence of adverse selection is considerable market distortion, which can develop into their 
inefficiency and subsequent market failure. As a result, a large quantity of poor quality goods is then 
sold by dubious companies. 
 
Moral hazard 
Another concept, which is undoubtedly connected with information asymmetry, is moral hazard. Moral 
hazard is the result of natural, not quite positive, human characteristics. It consists of the deliberate 
misuse of its own position by the side which is better informed. Suppose a homeowner whose house is 
insured can take less care of their house than if they had not insured it. The problem lies mainly in the
fact that the insurance company which arranges the policy does not know the insured person's exact 
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intentions – it is not sufficiently informed. Of course, in the opposite case, the price of the policy would 
be much higher. It is therefore quite rational to believe that moral hazard acts as impulse for the gradual 
increasing of prices, not only in the insurance market but in the economy in general (Šulc, 2012). 
 
2 Current knowledge in the area of information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry was indirectly dealt with as early as the 1950s by the famous economist F. von 
Hayek. In his article “The Use of Knowledge in Society“ Hayek (1945) deals with the problem of 
ignorance and uncertainty with regard to information about the current state of the market. In particular, 
the author points out that information can be interpr ted by various economic subjects completely 
differently, depending on their knowledge and experience. His concept of the market as a process of 
constant changes, and uncertainty with the emergence of unusual and previously unimaginable 
consequences, is a basic theoretical concept for inf rmation asymmetry, despite the fact that the author 
does not use the term information asymmetry in the article. 
A key breakthrough in the area of information asymmetry in economics was the article “The Economics 
of Information” by American economist George Stigler. Stigler (1961) was the first to announce a basic 
idea which until that time had not been taken into consideration. According to the author, information 
represents a certain source of value, meaning that it is not free property, but valuable property. In his
article, the author presents example of information asymmetry in various fields. He expresses several 
concepts with which he factually supports his theory. One of them is the fact that price dispersion occurs 
not only in heterogeneous products, but also in homogeneous ones. In the article, he proposed and 
outlined a principle for determining the market value of information. His findings show that the cost f 
finding information is not zero, which is why economic subjects do not want to possess all the 
information. He called the search for the market price the “search”, whereby the costs of the search 
increase with the number of sellers, because the main cost that this activity incurs is time (Stigler, 1961). 
Stigler's (1961) article aroused the interest of other economists, who began to research the issue of 
information asymmetry in more depth. In the year 1970, Akerlof published his very successful article - 
“The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and theMarket Mechanism”. Unlike Stigler (1961), who 
mainly dealt with information asymmetry about price, Akerlof (1970) focused on information 
asymmetry about quality, which he declares is present in the used car market. He presents the used car 
market as a typical market where information asymmetry occurs, leading to so-called adverse selection 
which deforms this market. 
Akerlof (1970) points to the fact that the used car m ket is dominated by automobiles which hide certain 
defects. Thus, the public automatically regards every car arriving in this market as defective, even 
though that may not be completely true. The problem li s in the fact that, without increased costs, one
cannot distinguish good cars from those which hide serious defects. Thus, a customer who wants to buy 
an automobile on the used car market has rational reasons to be concerned that the offered car has some 
concealed defect. 
A common question posed by the buyer might sound as follows: Why would the current owner want to 
sell the car if it isn't hiding some defect? Why don't they keep driving the car? When we look at the 
problem from the other perspective, the seller of a good car will not be motivated to sell their automobile, 
because they know that, thanks to the buyer's afore-mentioned thought process, they would not get an 
appropriate price for it. Akerlof (1970) draws the conclusion that bad cars displace good cars from the 
used car market, which is why the average quality of all automobiles on the used car market must be 
low. The author also points out that a completely nw car, which is purchased on a certain day, will have 
a much lower price/value on the following day, even though its technical condition is still the same. 
Another concept which influenced the economic theory of information is the theory of signalling by M. 
Spence. Spence (1973) reasons that the better informed side of the market has an interest in sharing part 
of the information with the less informed side of the market, so that it contributes to the more effici nt 
functioning of the given market. The economist J. E. Stiglitz (1973) followed on from Spence's concept 
with his theory of so-called screening. Screening is basically the opposite of the concept of signallig. 
It consists of the search for additional information by the less informed side of the market, which results 
in the subject being better informationally equipped. The search for relevant information is greatly 
affected by the cost of its procurement. That is why it is appropriate to involve companies specializing 
in the provision of information, with the aim of reducing the costs incurred by firms during its 
procurement. At the same time, this makes the specific market's operation more efficient. According to 
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the author, in cases where the market cannot cope, the government should take steps to prevent potential 
market failures (Stiglitz, 1973). 
S. A. Ross (1973) touched on the theme of moral hazard in his article ”The Economic Theory of Agency: 
the Principal’s Problem“. According to Ross (1973), a consequence of moral hazard is considered to be 
the existence of so-called costs of representation, which he defines as a situation where “one party, 
designated as the agent, acts on behalf of the other party, designated as the principal, under its 
authorization or as its representative”. The problem i s in the fact that the agent may not always act 
only in the principal's interest; on the contrary, they can pursue their own interest thanks to the fact that 
they possess better information. If the principal wnts to control their agent, they incur the costs of 
representation (Ross, 1973). 
Information asymmetry, as one of the possible causes of xtensive market failures, is dealt with by D. 
J. Porteous (1995) in his book “The Geography of Finance: Spatial Dimensions of Intermediary 
Behavior“. Among others, the author deals with the concept of the regional segmentation of financial 
markets, which can lead to uneven regional development. He sees the cause in information asymmetry 
in the credit market. Works by Berliant and Kung (2006) and Boadway (1997), which deal with 
information asymmetry in the labour market on a regional scale, point to the considerable effect of 
informational dissimilarity on regional development. 
Information asymmetry also has a considerable influe ce on investors' decisions about the allocation, 
timing and form of investments, which was already pointed out by Stigler (1961). Other economists who 
took an interest in the afore-mentioned issue were, fo  example, Razin et al (1999) and Huang and Lu 
(2008). In their publications, they deal with the effect of information asymmetry during decision-making 
by foreign investors about the allocation of capital in overseas markets. 
A major theme of the last decade is increasing the transparency of security traders, who can misuse their 
informational advantages against uninformed parties – retail clients. Information asymmetry, 
complemented by the moral hazard of some of the large financial institutions in the USA, is generally 
regarded as one of the causes of the start of the global financial crisis in the year 2008. Since that period, 
extensive financial market regulations, intended to help suppress these dishonest practices, have been 
passed. The afore-mentioned theme is dealt with by many authors. One of them, for example, is Yaling 
Lin (2016), who examines whether the greater transprency of security traders reduces information 
asymmetry in the financial markets, and thus aids the better functioning of the Taiwanese stock market. 
By analysing the “entrepreneur - investor” relationship, Batabyal and Nijkamp (2010) discover that 
investors have a great fear of entrepreneurs' moral hazard when making risky regional investments. They 
also mention that regional authorities cannot effectiv ly intervene in the “entrepreneur - investor” 
relationship, because they possess predominantly imperfect information. Therefore, they cannot prevent 
potential market failures. Thus, the authors came upon a fundamental fact, which is in conflict with the 
traditional theory of public finance. It assumes that public institutions possess perfect information (Šulc, 
2012). 
In the real world, public institutions are rarely perfectly informed; instead, they tend to possess poor 
quality and incomplete information. From this it follows that “the public sector must therefore face 
information asymmetry directly in the process of the performance of public administration” (Šulc, 2012, 
p. 192). The works which deal with information asymmetry in the public sector are mainly Boadway 
(1997), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Vickrey (196 ). 
 
3 The effect of information technology on information asymmetry 
Will the new information and communication technology help reduce information asymmetry? Does 
the economic mechanism itself also change, or will everything remain as before? These questions were 
clearly answered by Václav Klaus as early as the year 2000 in his article “Informační technologie nemění 
ekonomický mechanismus”. Klaus (2000) claims that te basic economic mechanism won't change if 
scarcity, and the effort to allocate limited resources so that they bring the greatest possible effect, exist 
in society. The author states that new technology undo btedly affects certain structural changes which 
affect the micro-economy, and particularly company functioning models. The completely opposite 
opinion on the given issue is defended in the article “Informační technologie mění ekonomiku” by Jiří 
Zlatuška (2000). 
The effect of modern ICT on information asymmetry was also dealt with, among others, by Simplice 
and Bertrand (2016) in the article “The Role of ICT in Reducing Information Asymmetry for Financial 
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Access“. The authors state that new technology reduc s information asymmetry, and also aids the better 
allocation of resources. Gajewski and Li (2015) analyse whether the internet has a positive impact on 
the reduction of information gaps between individual m rket subjects. Their research shows that the 
internet helps to reduce information asymmetry under th  assumption that the information is easily 
accessible and comprehensible for internet users. 
A key question is whether, on the contrary, information asymmetry is not actually becoming more 
pronounced with the advent of rapid technological ICT development. A certain overload of unimportant 
and irrelevant information can occur. First and foremost, the credibility of the information published on 
the internet is important. Every day, one can find a huge amount of untrustworthy, misleading and 
inaccurate information on the internet, which can hve a hidden manipulative character. Thus, on the 
other hand, information technology can contribute to the rapid dissemination of such false information, 




The article deals with information asymmetry, which is one of the main themes in economics in recent 
years. Several authors even received the Nobel Prize in Economics for their contributions to the analysis 
of markets with information asymmetry. 
In the introduction, we deal with the basic concepts which are closely connected to the article's main 
theme, which is information asymmetry in economics. Concepts such as moral hazard, adverse selection 
and the information gap, i.e. the results of the market subjects' dissimilar informational capabilities, are 
clarified. 
The next section analyses current knowledge in the area of information asymmetry on the basis of 
previously published works and articles. Of interest is the fact that, although information asymmetry has
occurred in economics since time immemorial, for a long time nobody dealt with this issue. A key article 
which contributed to deeper knowledge and defined nw theories in the economics of information is 
Stigler's (1961) article “The Economics of Information”. This article brought new ideas, concepts and 
theoretical conclusions to the area of the economics of information, which influenced and inspired many 
economists around the world. The article sets forth examples of markets where information asymmetry 
is most evident. For example, these include the used car and insurance markets. 
Another area on which we focus is information asymmetry in financial markets. We set forth examples 
of publications dealing with the analysis of the “entr preneur – investor” relationship, where the 
investors often fear the entrepreneurs' moral hazard.  Information asymmetry also has a considerable 
influence on investors' decisions about the allocati n, iming and form of investments. We deal with the
effect of information asymmetry on the outbreak of the global financial crisis, which occurred due to 
the moral hazard of some large financial institutions. Since then, financial markets have met with 
extensive regulations, whose aim is to make the financial markets' functioning more efficient and, most 
importantly, regain investors' trust. For example, research by Yaling (2016) shows that the greater 
transparency of security traders reduces information asymmetry, and thus aids the better functioning of 
the Taiwanese stock market. 
Another theme of the article is the effect of modern technology on information asymmetry. Does 
information technology change the economic mechanism? For now, a clear answer probably does not 
exist. For example, Klaus' (2000) and Zlatuška's (2000) opinions are completely different. On the 
contrary, according to Simplice and Bertrand (2016), information technology probably has a positive 
effect on information asymmetry, which is gradually reduced. Another potential tool for reducing 
information asymmetry can be the internet. According to Gajewski and Li (2015), the internet helps to 
reduce information asymmetry under the assumption that the information is easily accessible and 
comprehensible for internet users. 
The question arises of whether, on the contrary, information asymmetry is actually becoming more 
pronounced with the development of ICT. There is a huge variety of information on the internet. The 
mere accessibility of the information does not necessarily mean “knowledge” in the sense of its 
relevance. A certain overload of unimportant and irrelevant information can occur. In such a situation, 
it will be much more costly to “filter” the relevant information from that which is misleading, imperfct 
or even completely false. Thus, on the other hand, information technology can contribute to the rapid 
dissemination of this information, which can have a negative effect on individual subjects' decision-
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making and potentially result in market inefficiency. The aim of the article was to analyse current 
knowledge in the area of information asymmetry. From the performed analysis of the current state of 
knowledge in the area of information asymmetry, it follows that information asymmetry still raises many 
questions in economics which are waiting to be answered. One of them is the effect of information 
technology on information asymmetry in economics, which may play a key role in preventing potential 
market failures in the future. 
 
References 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for „lemons“: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), pp. 488-500. DOI: 10.2307/1879431 
 
Batabyal, A. A., Nijkamp, P. (2010). Asymmetric information, entrepreneurial activity, and the scope 
of fiscal policy in a open regional economy. International Regional Science Review, 33(4), pp. 421-436. 
DOI: 10.1177/0160017610375442 
 
Berliant, M., Kung, F. (2008). Can information asymmetry cause agglomeration? MPRA Paper, No. 
8388. Munich: MPRA. 
 
Boadway, R. (1997). Public economics and the theory of public policy. Canadian Journal of Economics, 
30(4a), pp. 753-772. DOI: 10.2307/136268 
 
Diamond, P., A., Mirrlees, J., A. (1971). Optional t xation and public production I: production 
efficiency. American Economics Review, 61(1), pp. 8-27. 
 
Gajewski, J. F., Li, L. (2015). Can Internet-based disclosure reduce information asymmetry? Advances 
in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 31(1), pp. 115-124. DOI: 
10.1016/j.adiac.2015.03.013 
 
Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review, 35(4), pp.519-530. 
 
Huang, S., Lu, Ch. (2008). Asymmetric information ad global sourcing. CES Discussion Paper 
Series, No. 16. Barcelona: Center for Research on Contemporary Economics Systems. 
 
Klaus, V. (2000). Informační technologie nemění ekonomický mechanismus. Hospodářské noviny, 
4.8.2000. 
 
Porteous, D. J. (1995). The Geography of Finance: Spatial Dimensions of Intermediary Behaviour. 
Averbury: Aldershot. 
 
Razin, A., Sadka, E., Yuen, Ch. (1999). Excessive FDI flows under asymmetric information. The 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 29. Cambridge: NBER 
 
Riley, J. G. (2001). Silver signals: twenty-five years of screening and signalling. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 39(June), pp. 432-478. DOI: 10.1257/jel.39.2.432 
 
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. American Economics 
Review, 63(2), pp. 134-139. 
 
Simplice, A., A., Bertrand M. (2016). The role of ICT in reducing information asymmetry for financial 
access. Research in International Business and Finance, 38, pp. 202-213. DOI: 
10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.04.011 
 




Soukupová, J., Hořejší, B., Macáková, L., Soukup, J. (1996). Mikroekonomie. Praha: Management 
Press. 
 
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), pp. 355-374. 
DOI: 10.2307/1882010 
 
Stigler, G. J. (1961). The economics of information. The Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), pp. 213-
225. DOI: 10.1086.258464 
 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1973). The theory of screening, education, and the distribution of income. Yale University, 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, No. 354. New Haven: Yale University. 
 
Šulc, M. (2012). Význam informační asymetrie pro regionální správu. ER-CEREI, No. 15, pp. 191-199. 
DOI: 10.7327/cerei.2012.09.05 
 
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 
16(1): 8-37. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x 
 
Walletzký, L. (2007). Ekonomie informací. Brno: MU. 
 
Yaling, L. (2016). Does Greater Market Transparency Reduce Information Asymmetry? Emerging 
Markets Finance and Trade, 52(11), pp. 2565-2584. DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2015.1087786 
 




Ing. Jan Kolar  
Vysoké učení technické v Brně 
Fakulta podnikatelská 
Ústav financí 
Kolejní 4, 61200 Brno 
Česká republika 
Tel.: +420 722 476 468 
E-mail: xpkolar12@vutbr.cz 
 
 
 
  
